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1. INTRODUCTION
Increasing company value, by generating greater returns than cost of 
capital, represents one of the main objectives of for-profit organizations 
(Jensen, 2001). However, the creation of value over the long-term 
may be affected by agency costs, since, among other aspects, a firm’s 
decision makers can act in accordance to their own interests, seeking 
the private benefits of control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004). Such a position, which may be adopted by managers 
or controlling shareholders, might reduce corporate market value, since 
decision makers could act according to their own interests alone, giving 
rise to the entrenchment effect (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Stulz, 1988; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002).
As ownership/control structure defines the type of agency conflict 
that occurs in a firm, its probable impact on corporate performance has 
been investigated by various studies. This literature can be divided into 
two groups. The first covers research that explores the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders, due to fragmented ownership/
control, focusing on the shareholder participation of directors and/
or board members (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Fahlenbrach 
& Stulz, 2009; Coles, Lemmon, & Meschke, 2012). The second 
includes studies that cover the agency conflict between controlling and 
This work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Corresponding author:
† ISCTE-Instituto Universitario de 
Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal
E-mail: dantebcviana@gmail.com
Ω Centro Universitário Estácio de 
Ribeirão Preto, Ribeirão Preto, SP, Brazil
E-mail: danielfcaixe@gmail.com
¥ Universidade Federal do Ceará, 
Fortaleza, CE, Brazil
E-mail: vponte@fortalnet.com.br
Received: 12/12/2017.
Revised: 06/08/2018.
Accepted: 11/09/2018.
Published Online: 06/12/2019.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15728/bbr.2019.16.4.6
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the moderating effect of economic instability in 
the relationship between the concentration of control and market value of 
firms. For this purpose, we built an unbalanced panel dataset composed 
of 341 Latin American companies from six countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The results of the dynamic models, 
estimated using the systemic generalized method of moments, indicate, 
in general, that concentration of control only reduces the market value 
of firms in environments with high economic instability. Thus, this study 
provides empirical evidence that times of economic instability encourage 
controlling shareholders to act even more strongly in their own interests, 
which may result in the expropriation of the wealth of smaller shareholders.
Keywords: Concentration of Control; Market Value; Economic Instabi-
lity.
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minority shareholders, resulting from the concentration of ownership/control, analyzing the 
shareholder participation of large shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Tam & 
Tan, 2007; Caixe & Krauter, 2013; Wang & Shailer, 2015).
Part of the scientific literature in finance that focuses on the agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders tests two hypotheses put forward by Claessens et 
al. (2002): the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. The first suggests that, by 
encouraging controlling shareholders to seek value creation, concentration of ownership 
(cash flow rights) would increase a firm’s market value (alignment effect). The second 
supposes that the excess voting rights of large shareholders would reduce company value, 
since these owners might expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders, as a result of 
their dominance over the control (entrenchment effect). There are studies that have found 
empirical evidence in favor (Lins; 2003; Caixe & Krauter, 2013; Wang & Shailer, 2015) 
and against these hypotheses (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Okimura, Silveira, & Rocha, 
2007; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010).
One area of this literature, which still includes few studies, examines the influence of 
the ownership/control structure of companies over the returns on their shares, in times of 
economic instability. Lemon and Lins (2003), for example, found evidence that the shares 
of companies in which the managers presented strong participation in the control had lower 
cumulative returns during the East Asian financial crisis. Similarly, Baek, Kang and Park 
(2004) observed that, during the Korean financial crisis, those firms whose controlling 
shareholders had excess voting rights also achieved inferior cumulative returns. Thus, these 
studies found indications that the impact of agency conflicts on corporate performance 
would be intensified in times of economic instability.
Based on the results by Lemon and Lins (2003) and Baek, Kang and Park (2004), this 
study investigates the moderating role of economic instability in the relationship between 
the concentration of control and market value of companies. To this end, we use longitudinal 
data on publicly-traded companies from six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), covering the period from 2010 to 2016. Economic 
instability is measured using three different variables: Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
the rating attributed by the agency Moody’s; and the volatility of the returns on the main 
stock index of each country. Seeking to treat possible sources of endogeneity, we estimate 
multiple regression models using the systemic generalized method of moments (Wintoki, 
Linck, & Netter, 2012). 
The choice of a sample composed of Latin American companies is mainly based on 
three reasons. First, in such companies, the agency conflict occurs between controlling and 
minority shareholders, as in most firms around the world (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). Second, the concentration in the control structure of these companies is 
expressive, due to the issuance of preferred stock, which do not grant voting rights to their 
holders. This type of mechanism for increasing control is more recurrent in Latin American 
countries than in other countries where the agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders also predominates (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Third, Latin American 
countries are more subject to macroeconomic shocks due to the economic instability of 
the region compared to more developed economies, which could directly affect returns on 
shares and, consequently, the market value of companies (Abugri, 2008).
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by showing that 
economic instability affects the relationship between ownership/control structure and 
corporate market value. More specifically, the results of the research suggest that times of 
economic instability increase the negative impact of concentration of control on the value 
of firms, raising the possibility of expropriation of the wealth of minority shareholders. 
This article is organized in five sections, which include this introduction. Section 2 
contains the theoretical framework for developing the hypothesis tested. Section 3 describes 
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the method employed. Finally, sections 4 and 5 present the results and conclusions of the 
research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Ownership/Control Structure and Performance
Agency Theory seeks to understand how conflicts of interests between a company’s 
stakeholders can have an impact on corporate decisions, affecting the firm’s performance 
(Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since the predominant type of agency conflict in 
companies is defined by their of ownership/control structure, the influence of the shareholder 
participation of managers/controlling shareholders over corporate performance has been 
the object of various studies, which are discussed in this section.
When shareholder capital is fragmented, the main agency conflict occurs between 
managers and shareholders, due to the separation between ownership and management, which 
is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries (Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu, 2008). Initially, 
the shareholder participation of managers would promote a greater alignment between the 
interests of managers and shareholders, resulting in an increase in company market value 
(alignment effect) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, above a certain level of ownership 
concentration, managers might act in their own interests, since shareholders would find it 
difficult to monitor them, resulting in a reduction in company value (entrenchment effect) 
(Stulz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).
However, outside the Anglo-Saxon countries, the concentration of ownership/control 
of firms predominates and, consequently, the agency conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders (Lin & Chuang, 2011). Under this understanding, Young et al. (2008) 
state that, despite there not being a single model capable of explaining the functioning of 
corporate governance in all institutional contexts, the principal-principal conflict is more 
significant for emerging countries than the traditional principal-agent conflicts.
Even in these less developed countries, there may still be the alignment and entrenchment 
effects, which, according to Claessens et al. (2002), would be linked to the shareholder 
participation of controllers in the following way. Concentration in the rights over cash 
flow (ownership) would benefit corporate performance, since it would encourage large 
shareholders to seek to maximize firm value, given that a significant portion of their wealth 
would be invested in the company (alignment effect). On the other hand, the excess voting 
rights of the controlling shareholders would enable them to pursue private benefits, which 
would reduce the value of the firm and, consequently, expropriate the wealth of the minority 
shareholders (entrenchment effect). The various forms of expropriation of minority by 
controlling shareholders include, for example, payment of lavish salaries to themselves; 
self-appointment to privileged executive roles and seats on the board for themselves 
or family-members and relatives (nepotism); use of company assets as a guarantee for 
personal transactions or borrowing company funds with commercial advantages, among 
others (Dami, Rogers, & Ribeiro, 2007). 
Studies have been identified that have empirically tested the alignment effect and 
entrenchment effect hypotheses, analyzing companies in different countries. Some studies 
have presented evidence that corroborate these hypotheses (Lins, 2003; Fahlenbrach & 
Stulz, 2009; Wang & Shailer, 2015; Caixe & Krauter, 2013; Marques, Guimarães, & Peixoto, 
2015), but others have not (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; Okimura, Silveira, & Rocha, 2007; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010). Among the studies 
that have found the influence of ownership/control structure over corporate market value, 
Caixe and Krauter (2013) and Marques, Guimarães and Peixoto (2015) used samples of 
Latin American companies, more specifically Brazilian ones. Their results indicate that the 
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participation of controlling shareholders in voting rights reduces firm value, thus capturing 
the entrenchment effect.
2.2. Ownership/Control vs Performance: Relevance of the 
Economic Environment
Empirical studies in the area of finance discuss the relevance of the organizational 
environment, as well as its potential effects on the way organizations elaborate their 
strategies and mold their values (Jensen, 1983). The organizational environment is defined, 
in a broad sense, as the space where organizations operate, and it can be analyzed and 
understood in two large groupings: (i) the specific environment; and (ii) the general 
environment (Schermerhorn, 1999).
The general environment can be interpreted as the one composed of more general 
elements, but that still has the potential to influence strategic decisions (Daft, Murphy, 
& Willmott, 2010). Thus, given the range and complexity of the general environment, it 
is possible to divide it into subenvironments, such as the legal, sociocultural, economic, 
political, and the ecological/environmental one. In turn, the specific environment involves, 
in addition to the organization, its clients, suppliers, and regulators. Figure 1 presents 
a general overview of the organizational environment and its division into specific and 
general.
Among the various subenvironments existing in the general environment, for the purposes 
of carrying out this study, we highlight the economic subenvironment, henceforth called the 
“economic environment” for simplicity. Among the different prisms through which we can 
analyze the economic environment where organizations operate in, economic instability 
features as one. Pearson and Clair (1998) highlight that periods of political crises and 
economic instability, together with a dysfunctional judicial system, can favor the creation 
of high levels of uncertainty, which can significantly affect the performance of companies 
in various ways. 
Reductions in the performance of companies in times of economic instability might 
be partly explained by the opportunistic behavior of decision makers. Empirical studies 
in the accounting area observe, for example, higher levels of earnings management in 
times of economic crises (Choi, Kim, & Lee, 2011; Silva, Weffort, Flores, & Silva, 2014), 
Figure 1 – Division of the Organizational Environment: Specific and General
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Daft, Murphy, and Willmott (2010).
BBR
16,4
404
reinforcing the idea that instability in the economic environment can encourage insiders to 
act opportunistically in an attempt to preserve their own interests, even at the expense of 
the other parties involved. In addition, studies in the area of corporate governance, such as 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Baek, Kang and Park (2004), show that in times of economic 
crises, companies with greater concentration in their control structures present a more 
expressive fall in the returns on their shares.
For example, in a cross-country analysis of firms in East Asia, Lemon and Lins (2003) 
present empirical evidence that the shares of companies in which the managers presented 
a greater share of the control had lower cumulative returns during the financial crisis 
in the region at the end of the 1990s. Similarly, Baek, Kang and Park (2004) observed 
that during the Korean financial crisis, companies whose controlling shareholders had 
excess voting rights also achieved inferior cumulative returns. The results of these studies 
reinforce the idea that instability in the economic environment can encourage insiders to act 
opportunistically, in an attempt to preserve their own interests.
Thus, in light of the Agency Theory under the lens of the principal-principal conflict 
and, in turn, based on the possible implications caused by instability in the economic 
environment in terms of encouraging opportunistic behavior on the part of decision makers, 
this study tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: A greater level of economic instability enhances the effect of concentration 
of control over corporate market value.
3. METHOD
3.1. Sample
The study sample covers 341 non-financial companies from six Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). The choice of countries 
was based on the availability of information relating to the economic-financial variables 
used in the study. The analysis period covers the years from 2010 to 2016, forming an 
unbalanced panel dataset, totaling 1,305 firm-year observations. With a view to preserving 
the comparability between the countries with regards to the economic-financial variables 
investigated, only those companies that disclosed their financial statements in compliance 
with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were inserted into the analysis. 
The data used in the construction of the study variables were collected from the Capital 
IQ®, Economática®, and Yahoo Finance databases.
3.2. Empirical model
The empirical model of the study is described by Equation (1):
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In which: i is the company; t is the year; EV is the Enterprise Value, calculated by adding 
the market value of the shares and the accounting value of the debts, minus the accounting 
value of the cash equivalents; TA is the total assets; CONC is the proportion of shares 
with voting rights belonging to the biggest shareholder; SIZE is the size of the company 
(natural logarithm of total assets);  and  are dummies that represent countries in periods of 
high and low economic instability, respectively; ROIC is the return on invested capital (net 
operating income divided by the sum of net equity and interest bearing liabilities); IND 
is the indebtedness (current liabilities divided by total assets); ADR is a dummy for the 
issuance of American Depositary Receipts; TYPE_CON are three dummies that represent 
four cases relating to the shareholder control of the firm (Individual, Institutional, State, and 
Fragmented), as according to the classification proposed by the Capital IQ® database;  is 
the specific effect of the firm (unobserved heterogeneity);  is the temporal component (year 
dummies); and  is the error term.
Given the proposed empirical model, the hypothesis of this study is tested by comparing 
the coefficients of the variables of interaction between the concentration of control () and the 
dummies for economic instability ( and ). Three variables are used to measure the economic 
instability of the countries analyzed: (i) the annual rating given by the agency Moody’s; 
(ii) the annual volatility of the main stock index; and the annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita. Annually, the companies were classified, according to the median value 
of each one of these three variables, into two groups: high instability −  (values equal to or 
greater than the median for the annual rating and volatility, as well as values lower than the 
median for the GDP per capita); and low instability −  (values lower than the median for 
the annual rating and volatility, as well as values equal to or greater than the median for the 
GDP per capita).
With the rating from the agency Moody’s, we sought to measure the countries’ risk 
of default. Especially in emerging markets, a reduction in rating increases the country’s 
risk, making access to international capital markets difficult and raising interest rates in the 
economy (Luitel, Vanpée, & Moor, 2016). The volatility of the returns on the main stock 
indices reflects the uncertainty of the countries’ stock markets. This measure is obtained by 
the standard deviation of the logarithmic daily returns on the main theoretical portfolios of 
the economies’ stocks, calculated based on the closing prices during the 252 trading days 
in the year (Klomp & Haan, 2009). Finally, GDP is an indicator of the level of economic 
activity in the countries, and is directly affected by macroeconomic instability (Raddatz, 
2007; Ali & Rehman, 2015).
The omission of relevant variables in the model may result in a spurious correlation 
between the variables of interest. Thus, Equation (1) also includes additional variables 
indicated by the literature as being capable of controlling the main relationship analyzed. 
The size of the company (SIZE), for example, appears to have important implications for 
its market value, since, in bigger companies, controlling shareholders would, in theory, 
face difficulties in maintaining a high participation in total equity (Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
& Palia, 1999). Regarding the return on invested capital (ROIC) and its implication with 
respect to the value of the firm, it should be noted that when facing the trade-off between 
selling, buying, or holding their shares, investors may base their decisions on the return on 
these securities (Caixe & Krauter, 2013; Cho & Pucik, 2005). 
Also in this discussion, with regard to the level of indebtedness (IND), among other 
aspects, there are indications that a more indebted firm has greater financial risk, which would 
lead the market to apply a higher discount rate on its securities, reducing its market value 
(Braouezec, 2009; Crisóstomo & Pinheiro, 2015). The issuance of American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR) also appears to generate additional benefits for the firm’s value, given the 
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3.2.1 Estimation and endogeneity
The studies on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
performance are subject to endogeneity problems, which can result in the estimation of 
biased and inconsistent coefficients for the variables of interest (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 
2012). This section explains the Systemic Generalized Method of Moments (Sys-GMM). 
Developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), it can mitigate 
sources of endogeneity, such as unobserved heterogeneity, the feedback effect (or dynamic 
endogeneity), and simultaneity (or reverse causality).
Chart 1 – Dependent, independent, and control variables: proxies, references, and data sources.
Construct Variable Proxy Basis Source
Market Value of 
the Firm
Enterprise Value 
(ENTERP)
Enterprise Value / Total Assets, 
where Enterprise Value = 
Quotation x Total Shares + 
Interest Bearing Liabilities 
(Current and Non Current) – 
Cash and Short Term Investments
Caixe and Krauter (2013); 
Penman, Richardson, and 
Tuna (2007)
Capital IQ®
Concentration 
of Control
Concentration of Shares 
with Voting Rights 
(CONC)
Proportion of shares with voting 
rights belonging to the main 
shareholder
Caixe and Krauter (2013); 
Farooq and Zaroauli (2016); 
Li et al. (2015)
Capital IQ®
Economic 
Environment
Economic Instability 
(INST)
Annual risk rating of the countries Luitel, Vanpée, and Moor 
(2016)
Moody's Investors 
Service 
Volatility: standard deviation of 
the logarithmic daily returns on 
the main theoretical portfolios, 
calculated based on the closing 
prices during the 252 trading days 
in the year
Klomp and Haan (2009) Stock exchanges 
of the countries 
investigated
Annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita
Raddatz (2007); Ali, and 
Rehman (2015)
F.M.I.
Control 
Variables
Size Logaritmo Natural do Ativo Total Himmelberg, Hubbard e Palia 
(1999)
Capital IQ®
(SIZ) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999)
Capital IQ®
Profitability (ROIC) Return on invested capital (net 
operating income divided by the 
sum of net equity and interest 
bearing liabilities) 
Caixe and Krauter (2013); 
Cho and Pucik (2005)
Capital IQ®
Indebtedness (IND) Current liabilities divided by total 
assets
Braouezec (2009); Crisóstomo 
and Pinheiro (2015)
Capital IQ®
American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR)
Dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the company has ADR, 
and 0 otherwise
Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) Capital IQ®
Type of Shareholder 
Control
Dummies that represent four 
cases relating to the shareholder 
control of the firm (Individual, 
Institutional, State, and 
Fragmented)
Xia and Walker (2015) Capital IQ®
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
greater coverage of analysts as well as an increase in the precision of their forecasts (Lang, 
Lins, & Miller, 2003). Finally, we also highlight the relevance of discussions relating to the 
type of shareholder control (TYPE_CON), since, among other factors, different types of 
controls impose different types of goals and restrictions on the governance of companies, 
offering distinct opportunities and forms of acquiring resources (Xia & Walker, 2015), 
which would possibly lead to implications for the market value of the firm.
A summary of the variables used in the model of this research, their definitions, proxies, 
and basis, is presented in Chart 1.
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Unobserved heterogeneity refers to variables that are difficult to measure or that are 
not directly observed by the researcher, but that can affect the dependent and independent 
variables. The company’s market power, the ability of the managers (or controlling 
shareholders), and the management monitoring technology are examples of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). If such sources of endogeneity 
are disregarded, the econometric model can suffer from omitted variable bias (Roberts 
& Whited, 2013). Panel dataset estimators, such as Fixed Effects (FE) and Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), control for unobserved heterogeneity, unlike the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) method applied to cross-sectional data (Coles, Lemmon, & Meschke, 
2012). 
The feedback effect arises when the response variable is influenced by its lagged values. 
Studies indicate that the market value of a firm is affected by its first lag, pointing to the 
need to employ dynamic models to investigate the relationship between governance and 
performance variables (Caixe & Krauter, 2013, 2014). The Fixed Effects estimator does not 
allow for the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable in the model, since it is based on 
the assumption of strict endogeneity of the regressors, unlike the GMM estimator (Wintoki, 
Linck, & Netter, 2012). Flannery and Hankins (2013) compared the statistical properties of 
various dynamic model estimators. According to the authors, the Sys-GMM should be the 
standard chosen for research in the area of corporate finance. 
Another source of endogeneity is reverse causality, which occurs when the dependent 
variable is affected, but also influences, simultaneously, one or more regressors (Roberts & 
Whited, 2013). Some studies have found evidence that the value of a firm and its ownership/
control structure are determined jointly, highlighting the importance of treating the latter as 
endogenous (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Lins, 2003; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009). One 
possible alternative for controlling for simultaneity is by identifying external instruments 
for endogenous variables, and employing the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator. 
However, finding valid external instruments is a difficult task, and the Sys-GMM estimator 
can deal with reverse causality through the selection of valid internal instruments for the 
endogenous variables and the use of dynamic models (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).
In light of what has been discussed in this section, Equation (1) is estimated by Sys-GMM, 
which uses level and difference equations. The independent variables are instrumentalized: 
in the level equation, by the second, third, and fourth lags of the difference variables; 
and, in the differences equation, by the second lag of the level variables (since the other 
lags are redundant) (Roodman, 2006). The number of lags employed is limited due to the 
proliferation of instruments problem, which means the Hansen test tends to accept the 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid (Roodman, 2009).
4. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the microeconomic variables of the study. 
Note that most of the observations are from Chilean companies, followed by Brazilian, 
Mexican, Peruvian, and Colombian ones. Considering the total sample, it is also observed 
that the median participation of the biggest shareholder in the voting rights is 34.33%, 
signaling that most of the companies in the sample were not under majority control during 
the period studied. Among the countries analyzed, Argentina and Chile are the ones that 
present the highest (62.20%) and the lowest (35.51%) means for concentration of control, 
respectively. With relation to Brazil, the mean participation of the biggest shareholder in 
the voting rights is 37.48%. This indicates more fragmented shareholder control in the 
Brazilian market, since studies that considered previous periods, such as Silveira, Barros 
and Famá (2008) and Caixe and Krauter (2013), found mean values that vary from 73% to 
56%, approximately.
BBR
16,4
408
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of the microeconomic variables 
Countries Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max CV
Argentina EV/TA 55 1.2820 1.0660 0.7840 0.2316 3.4755 0.6115
CONC 55 0.6220 0.5900 0.1774 0.2600 0.9600 0.2851
SIZE 55 5.4863 5.7255 1.1543 3.0445 9.3162 0.2104
ROIC 55 0.1035 0.0910 0.1407 -0.2990 0.5410 1.3588
IND 55 0.6448 0.6534 0.1705 0.2919 0.9322 0.2644
Brazil EV/TA 461 1.0324 0.7643 0.7389 -0.1281 3.7356 0.7157
CONC 461 0.3748 0.3154 0.2456 0.0014 1.0000 0.6552
SIZE 461 0.0569 0.0630 0.1583 -2.3730 0.6270 2.7829
ROIC 461 0.0340 0.0805 0.3939 -3.8811 2.0064 11.5721
IND 461 0.5512 0.5545 0.1816 0.0131 0.9688 0.3296
Chile EV/TA 570 0.8248 0.7349 0.5076 -0.3901 3.8708 0.6154
CONC 570 0.3551 0.3303 0.1839 0.0471 0.9449 0.5180
SIZE 570 6.1561 6.1405 1.9599 1.5412 10.9347 0.3184
ROIC 570 0.0556 0.0451 0.1775 -0.4710 3.3260 3.1924
IND 570 0.4448 0.4529 0.1913 0.0014 0.8823 0.4300
Colombia EV/TA 22 0.6452 0.5511 0.4125 0.0750 1.5803 0.6394
CONC 22 0.4162 0.3534 0.2084 0.1685 0.8849 0.5006
SIZE 22 6.7979 6.3414 2.0670 2.8154 10.6070 0.3041
ROIC 22 0.0604 0.0410 0.0541 -0.0022 0.1856 0.8965
END 22 0.4286 0.3965 0.1590 0.1080 0.6998 0.3710
Mexico EV/TA 172 1.2987 1.1420 0.7133 0.2530 3.7627 0.5492
CONC 172 0.4352 0.4193 0.2168 0.0622 0.9999 0.4982
SIZE 172 7.4926 7.4685 1.4870 3.4935 11.3691 0.1985
ROIC 172 0.0801 0.0690 0.0652 -0.2680 0.4060 0.8136
IND 172 0.5167 0.4886 0.1757 0.1236 0.9232 0.3401
Peru EV/TA 25 1.0034 0.9377 0.6296 0.0602 3.1825 0.6275
CONC 25 0.4132 0.3908 0.2781 0.0618 1.0000 0.6731
SIZE 25 6.4981 6.9101 1.4311 3.4563 8.0609 0.2202
ROIC 25 0.0827 0.0800 0.1018 -0.2580 0.2910 1.2301
IND 25 0.4369 0.4709 0.1685 0.0436 0.6722 0.3858
Latin EV/TA 1305 0.9803 0.7849 0.6617 -0.3901 3.8708 0.6750
America CONC 1305 0.3860 0.3433 0.2209 0.0014 1.0000 0.5722
SIZE 1305 6.7349 6.7899 1.8220 1.5412 12.6965 0.2705
ROIC 1305 0.0619 0.0570 0.1561 -2.3730 3.3260 2.5207
IND 1305 0.4998 0.5042 0.1927 0.0014 0.9688 0.3855
Note: EV /TA = enterprise value scaled by total assets. CONC = proportion of shares with voting rights of the biggest share-
holder. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. ROIC = return on invested capital (net operating income divided by the sum 
of net equity and interest bearing liabilities). IND = current liabilities scaled by total assets.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 2 contemplates the correlation matrix of the continuous variables investigated. 
It is possible to observe a negative and statistically significant linear association between 
the market value (EV/TA) and the concentration of control (CONC) of the companies. On 
the other hand, the variables size (SIZE) and return on invested capital (ROIC) present a 
positive and significant linear association with EV/TA. In addition, the variables ROIC and 
CONC are positively correlated.
In Table 3, we investigate the relationship between EV/TA and CONC through the 
estimation of Equation (1) by Sys-GMM. The results of the first specification, despite not 
considering economic instability, indicate that concentration of control reduces corporate 
market value. This evidence is consistent with the entrenchment effect hypothesis by 
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Tabela 3 – Relationship between concentration of control and market value (Sys-GMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(EVt / TAt) t-1 0.466*** 0.458*** 0.458*** 0.481***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.097)
CONCt -0.238**
(0.119)
CONCt × INSTHigh -0.280** -0.279** -0.019
(0.126) (0.125) (0.233)
CONCt × INSTLow -0.023 -0.021 0.390
(0.156) (0.157) (0.509)
SIZE 0.111** 0.066* 0.065* 0.045*
(0.045) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032)
ROICt 0.149 0.093 0.094 0.077
(0.130) (0.124) (0.124) (0.109)
ENDt -0.251 -0.185 -0.177 -0.463
(0.167) (0.164) (0.166) (0.324)
ADRt 0.346 0.534 0.542 -0.058
(0.390) (0.333) (0.338) (0.184)
INDIVt 0.406 0.425 0.430 0.532**
(0.203) (0.166) (0.169) (0.182)
ESTt -0.977 -0.663 -0.651 -0.556
(0.795) (0.477) (0.473) (0.491)
INSTITt -0.096 -0.085 -0.087 -0.062
(0.091) (0.089) (0.089) (0.093)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instability Measure - Rating Volatility GDP per capita
Nº of Observations 1,082 1,082 1,082 1,082
Nº of Instruments 145 162 162 162
AR (1) – p-value 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
AR (2) – p-value 0.274 0.234 0.234 0.214
Hansen J Test – p-value 0.291 0.176 0.170 0.160
Note: The dependent variable is the enterprise value scaled by total assets (EV/TA). CONC is the proportion of shares with 
voting rights of the biggest shareholder. INSTHigh and INSTLow are dummies for high and low economic instability, respectively. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROIC is return on invested capital. ADR is the dummy for the issuance of ADR. 
IND is indebtedness. INDIV, STATE, and INSTIT are dummies for individual, state, and institutional control, respectively. 
Coefficients are estimated by Sys-GMM in two stages with Windmeijer correction (2005). Arellano and Bond tests for au-
tocorrelation of the first and second order residuals are presented - AR(1) and AR(2); as well as the Hansen J Test (1982) for 
validity of the instruments. Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 2 – Correlation Matrix – Pearson’s Coefficient (Continuous Variables)
EV/TA CONC SIZE ROIC IND
EV/TA 1.0000
CONC -0.1333*** 1.0000
SIZE 0.0978*** -0.0169 1.0000
ROIC 0.1906*** 0.0775*** 0.0080 1.0000
IND 0.0125 0.0198 0.3478*** -0.0294 1.0000
Note: EV /TA = enterprise value scaled by total assets. CONC = proportion of shares with voting rights of the biggest share-
holder. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. ROIC = return on invested capital (net operating income divided by the sum 
of net equity and interest bearing liabilities). IND = current liabilities scaled by total assets.*, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Claessens et al. (2002) and corroborates the results by Caixe and Krauter (2013) and 
Marques, Guimarães and Peixoto (2015).
In columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 3, the coefficient of the CONC variable is estimated, 
separately, for companies that operated in environments with high and low economic 
instability. The coefficients of  and  indicate that the negative impact of the concentration 
of voting rights over corporate market value is only maintained in times of high economic 
instability, considering all the measures of economic instability proposed, except for 
GDP per capita (see column 4) – where the coefficient of the variables is not statistically 
significant for explaining the market value of the firm. These results suggest, therefore, that 
the risk rating and market volatility variables, representative of the countries’ economic 
environment, are important for understanding the relationship between control structure 
and corporate performance. More specifically, it could be suggested that by increasing the 
uncertainty in relation to the company’s future performance, economic instability possibly 
induces controlling shareholders to seek private benefits and not the maximization of 
corporate market value.
It is also valid to highlight that, in all the specifications tested, the first lag of the response 
variable [] positively influences corporate market value, as in Caixe and Krauter (2013; 
2014). This result reinforces the importance of using dynamic models in corporate finance 
studies, showing that statistical specifications can be subject to omitted relevant variable 
bias (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). In addition to , the firm size () variable also presents a 
positive and significant coefficient with at least 90% confidence, in all the columns of Table 
3, signaling that the biggest companies tend to have a lower market value and, therefore, 
confirming the results indicated by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999).
The robustness of the Sys-GMM estimations depends on the validity of the instruments 
used. The p-values of the Arellano and Bond test (1991) do  not reject the hypothesis of 
autocorrelation of the second order residuals, indicating that the instruments are exogenous. 
In turn, the p-values of the Hansen test (1982) do not reject the hypothesis that the Sys-
GMM instruments are valid.
Finally, it is important to highlight that we also tested models estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects (FE) – see tables A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A. The 
results of the OLS estimations reveal that the variables CONC, , and  do not present a 
statistically significant coefficient for explaining the market value of the firm, considering the 
different proxies for economic instability. On the other hand, the Fixed Effects estimations 
demonstrate that  has a positive sign, considering the risk rating as a measure of economic 
instability; and the variable  has a negative sign, considering the countries’ GDP per capita 
as a measure of economic instability. These results corroborate the proposed research 
hypothesis, aligning with the understanding that periods of greater economic instability 
enhance the negative effects of the concentration of control over the market value of the 
firm.  
 However, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, it is appropriate to reiterate that OLS and FE are 
not dynamic model estimators and, therefore, their results should be analyzed with caution. 
Studies such as Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2010), Wintoki et al. (2012), and Ullah, Akhtar and 
Zaefarian (2018) have also observed different results for GMM, OLS, and FE estimations. 
Just like these authors, as determinants of such differences – between the empirical results 
presented in Table 3 and Appendix A – we attribute endogeneity problems, which are not 
controlled by the OLS and EF estimators.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates the relationship between the concentration of control and market 
value of 341 Latin American companies, and whether this relationship could be moderated 
by characteristics relating to the economic environment in which the companies operate. 
In general, the results show that the participation of the biggest shareholder in the voting 
rights reduces the market value of the firm – thus aligning with the entrenchment effect 
perspective (Claessens et al., 2002). In addition, this study presents evidence that the 
negative impact of the control structure on corporate performance only occurs in times of 
greater economic instability in the countries.
These results highlight the harmful effects of voting rights concentration over the 
market value of firms in emerging markets. Thus, given a recessionary scenario, there are 
indications that controlling shareholders might act even more in their own interests, due to 
the increase in uncertainty in relation to future company performance. The opportunistic 
behavior of controlling shareholders in times of increased economic instability could 
occur, among other examples, through the extraction of private benefits of control, favoring 
an increase in transactions with related parties, earnings management, and the use of 
privileged information. We thus reiterate the importance of improving the governance of 
Latin American companies, which, besides presenting a high concentration of control and 
low legal enforcement in the protection of minority shareholders, operate in companies 
with greater economic instability.
This study adds new empirical evidence to the finance literature by raising discussions 
about the role of the economic environment in the relationship between concentration of 
control and the market value of companies in emerging markets. Note, however, that the 
results should be taken with caution, since the classification proposed for the economies 
between “low” and “high” instability is limited to the countries and the periods analyzed. 
We therefore suggest developing other studies that are able to examine the relationship 
between ownership/control structure and corporate performance in other periods of 
economic instability, with different proxies capable of capturing this effect. The 2008-2009 
financial crisis, for example, which affected various economies, could be explored by future 
research, with the aim of complementing the discussions presented in this article. 
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APPENDIX A – Additional Tests
Table A.1 – Relationship between concentration of control and market value (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(EVt ⁄ TAt )(t-1) 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.631***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083)
CONCt -0.068
(0.063)
CONCt × INSTHigh -0.049 -0.047 -0.054
(0.069) (0.069) (0.034)
CONCt × INSTLow -0.090 -0.091 -0.094
(0.071) (0.072) (0.083)
SIZEt -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ROICt 0.318 0.320 0.320 0.309
(0.242) (0.241) (0.241) (0.239)
INDt 0.042 0.031 0.030 0.043
(0.093) (0.098) (0.098) (0.093)
ADRt 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
INDIVt 0.038 0.041 0.042 0.033
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060)
STATEt 0.027 0.024 0.026 0.002
(0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
INSTITt -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instability Measure - Rating Volatility GDP per capita
Nº of Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305
Note: The dependent variable is the enterprise value scaled by total assets (EV/TA). CONC is the proportion of shares with 
voting rights of the biggest shareholder. INSTHigh and INSTLow are dummies for high and low economic instability, respectively. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROIC is return on invested capital. ADR is the dummy for the issuance of ADR. 
IND is indebtedness. INDIV, STATE, and INSTIT are dummies for individual, state, and institutional control, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table A.2 – Relationship between concentration of control and market value (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(EVt / ATt )(t-1) 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
CONCt 0.223
(0.258)
CONCt × INSTHigh 0.153 0.175 -0.007*
(0.430) (0.409) (0.056)
CONCt × INSTLow 0.293* 0.271 0.122
(0.163) (0.167) (0.135)
TAMt -0.252*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.252***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071)
ROICt 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.041
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.160)
ENDt 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.010
(0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.254)
ADRt -0.148* -0.142 -0.144 -0.132*
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.077)
INDIVt 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.027
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
ESTt -0.148* -0.164 -0.159 -0.199***
(0.076) (0.110) (0.105) (0.042)
INSTITt -0.086 -0.087 -0.087 -0.084
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instability Measure - Rating Volatility GDP per capita
Nº of Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305
Note: The dependent variable is the enterprise value scaled by total assets (EV/TA). CONC is the proportion of shares with 
voting rights of the biggest shareholder. INSTHigh and INSTLow are dummies for high and low economic instability, respectively. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROIC is return on invested capital. ADR is the dummy for the issuance of ADR. 
IND is indebtedness. INDIV, STATE, and INSTIT are dummies for individual, state, and institutional control, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
